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OPTIMAL SKILL DISTRIBUTION IN MIRRLEESIAN TAXATION
Özlem Köse
Economics, M.A. Thesis, 2010
Supervisor: Hakk¬Yaz¬c¬
Abstract
The motivation of our study is how to redistribute income earning skills
in a heterogeneous society to reach the social optimum. Leung and Yaz¬c¬
(2010) write the rst paper that analyzes this issue analytically. In light of
their study, we analyze the optimum skill distribution with utilitarian and
egalitarian social welfare functions and conduct two analyses. Firstly, we pro-
vide numerical simulations to measure the welfare e¤ects of skill distribution
choice under di¤erent social welfare functions. Secondly, we characterize the
optimum skill distribution for di¤erent objective welfare functions with dif-
ferent assumptions. Our rst result indicates that, it is always optimal to
distribute all skills to one type in a society regardless of whether we use egal-
itarian or utilitarian objective social welfare functions. Secondly, an increase
in welfare from Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution to Mirrleesian
taxation with skill distribution is always much more than an increase from
laissez faire market to Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution in both
utilitarian and egalitarian problems. Our nal result is that the economy with
perfectly unequal skill distribution provides a more egalitarian society in terms
of how utilities are distributed across agents, in both utilitarian and egalitarian
problems.
Keywords: Skill distribution, utilitarian social welfare function, egalitar-
ian social welfare function, Mirrleesian taxation, redistribution.
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M·IRRLEES YAKLAS¸IMI ·ILE VERG·ILEND·IRMEDE OPT·IMAL
YETENEK DA¼GILIMI
Özlem Köse
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2010
Tez Dan¬¸sman¬: Hakk¬Yaz¬c¬
Özet
Bizim çal¬¸smam¬z¬n motivasyonu farkl¬yap¬da bireyleri olan bir toplumda
gelir elde etmemizi sa¼glayan yetenekleri nas¬l da¼g¬tmal¬y¬z ki toplum refah¬
optimal olsun. Leung ve Yaz¬c¬(2010) bu konuyu analitik olarak analiz ya-
pan ilk çal¬¸smad¬r. Bu çal¬¸sman¬n ¬¸s¬¼g¬nda, optimal yetenek da¼g¬t¬m¬n¬ fay-
dac¬ve es¸itlikçi toplumsal refah fonksiyonlar¬yla ayr¬ayr¬ inceledik ve 2 tür
analiz yapt¬k. Öncelikle, farkl¬toplumsal refah fonksiyonlar¬alt¬nda yetenek
da¼g¬t¬m seçimlerinin refaha olan etkilerini ölçen bir nümerik analiz sunduk.
·Ikinci olarak, optimal yetenek da¼g¬t¬m¬n¬farkl¬refah fonksiyonlar¬için, farkl¬
varsay¬mlarla karakterize ettik. ·Ilk sonucumuz s¸unu gösteriyor ki, kullan¬lan
refah fonksiyonun faydac¬ya da es¸itlikçi olmas¬ndan ba¼g¬ms¬z olarak, bütün
yetene¼gi toplumda sadece bir tipe da¼g¬tmak her zaman optimaldir. ·Ikinci sonu-
cumuz ise, yetenek da¼g¬t¬m¬yap¬lmayan Mirrlees yaklas¸¬m¬ile vergilendirme-
den, yetenek da¼g¬t¬m¬yapanMirrlees yakalas¸¬m¬ile vergilendirmeye geçildi¼ginde
elde edilen refah art¬¸s¬n¬n, laissez faire piyasas¬ndan yetenek da¼g¬t¬m¬yap¬l-
mayan Mirrlees yaklas¸¬m¬ ile vergilendirmeye geçildi¼ginde elde edilen refah
art¬¸s¬ndan hem faydac¬ hem de es¸itlikçi problemlerde her zaman çok daha
fazla olmas¬d¬r. Son sonucumuz ise yine hem faydac¬hem de es¸itlikçi problem-
lerde, tamamen es¸it olamayan bir s¸ekilde yap¬lan yetenek da¼g¬t¬m¬n¬n tipler
aras¬ndaki hazlar¬n da¼g¬l¬m¬aç¬s¬ndan daha es¸itlikçi bir toplum yap¬s¬sa¼gl¬yor
olmas¬d¬r.
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Yetenek da¼g¬t¬m¬, faydac¬toplumsal refah fonksiy-
onu, es¸itlikçi toplumsal refah fonksiyonu, Mirrlees yaklas¸¬m¬ile vergilendirme,
yeniden da¼g¬t¬m.
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1 Introduction
A fundamental question in public economics is how to redistribute resources
among people. Since people are heterogeneous in their skill levels and their
skill levels are private information (as in Mirrlees 1971), people with higher
skill levels may nd it optimum to mimic lower skilled people unless their hard
work is rewarded. This situation is the main problem associated with private
information skill levels.
The redistribution among agents is done ex-post by transferring consump-
tion goods across the types in Mirrlees (1971). Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) in-
troduce a new channel of redistribution of resources to the Mirrleesian model.
There, they redistribute resources via skill distribution ex-ante. A more egali-
tarian ex-ante skill distribution is equal to transferring skills from high skilled
agents to those with lower skills, which implies a more equal consumption dis-
tribution with the same amount of ex-post redistribution. They ask how much
ex-ante skill distribution is optimal and analyze this question in a static Mir-
rleesian economy with two types of agents whose fractions in a society is given.
The main result of their paper is that it is always optimal to redistribute all
skills to only one type, namely to the high skilled type.
To understand the question and the result, it will be helpful to give a real
life example, one can think of skill as a type of production capacity that can
be taught and learned in schools. According to this interpretation, society has
a xed amount of education force that it can employ to teach di¤erent groups
of people. By choosing its education policy, society is essentially choosing the
skill distribution. With this interpretation, our result says that it is optimal
to channel all the education towards one group. It is important to note that
this is just an example and one can think of di¤erent examples.
In the environment in which Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) made their analysis,
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the utilities the agents receive from their consumption is strictly concave and
the disutility they receive from their labor e¤ort is weakly convex. Our con-
tribution to their paper is twofold. First, we prove that in the case of linear
utilities and utilitarian social welfare, the result of Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) is
still true. Therefore, we provide an extension of their theoretical result.
Second, even though Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) show that perfectly unequal
skill distribution is optimal, they do not provide any numerical results as to the
importance of such policy. We provide numerical simulations to measure the
welfare e¤ect of the perfectly unequal skill distribution policy. We perform this
numerical analysis not only for utilitarian social objective but also egalitarian
social objective. Our main numerical nding is that an increase in the social
welfare from Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution to Mirrleesian tax-
ation with skill distribution is much more than an increase from laissez faire
market to Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution. Furthermore, an
economy with perfectly unequal skill distribution provides a more egalitarian
society in terms of how utilities are distributed across agents. These numerical
ndings indicates that public policies regarding skill distribution choice can be
quite important for social welfare.
It is also important that in our numerical simulations we nd that under
egalitarian social objective optimal skill distribution is the perfectly unequal
one. This result is not a proof, but it suggests that the result of Leung and
Yaz¬c¬(2010) may be true under more general social welfare functions than
utilitarian form.
Finally, this analysis points out that if governments decide to perform a
skill distribution policy and distribute skills to only one type of people, then
they need to be careful about income taxation redistribution. If governments
skip income taxation, this results in an economy in which one type has no
income as a signicant levels of inequality. This new situation would be worse
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in terms of equality compared to a laissez faire market.
In our analysis there is a tradeo¤ between production e¢ ciency and the
distribution of consumption. By giving all skills to one type of people, total
production increases without increasing the total labor level. In other words,
by giving all of the skills to only one type, the same level of production can be
acquired with less labor force. If we consider only the production e¢ ciency,
then our solution must be at the corner but there is also a distribution aspect
and giving all the skills to only one type and naturally making only this type
to work increases the utility of pretending the high type as a low skill type.
In our analysis, even if this tradeo¤ is seen in an egalitarian problem type,
the e¤ect of productive e¢ ciency is more than the e¤ect of distribution of
consumption and as a result the optimal solution is attained at the corner. In
the utilitarian problem type, since our assumption on utility function is linear,
only the e¤ect of productive e¢ ciency is seen and as expected, all of the skills
are assigned to the high skill type.
Having completed our analysis with two types of agents, we generalize our
analysis to an arbitrary number of agent types. For this case, we only con-
duct numerical analysis. With an arbitrary number of types, we always nd
it optimal to distribute all of the skills to the highest skilled type. By this
we show that optimality of perfectly unequal skill distribution is robust to the
number of types. Then, we compare the numerical results we obtained for a
laissez-faire market, Mirrleesian economy with ex-post consumption redistrib-
ution and Mirrleesian economy with both ex-post consumption redistribution
and ex-ante skill distribution both for utilitarian and egalitarian problems.
The literature consists of a number of works that follow Mirrlees (1971).
These works can be categorized into four main groups. The rst group is con-
centrated in quantitative study. Emmanuel Saez (2001) and Tuomala (1990)
can be seen as the most important members of this group. In Emmanuel Saez
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(2001), he tries to show that there is a connection between tax methods and
earnings. He shows that new results for optimal income taxation can be at-
tained by deriving the optimal income tax rates using elasticity straightly. By
this method, he shows how di¤erent economic e¤ects become more e¤ective
and the signicant e¤ects among them in the Mirrleesian optimal income tax-
ation. He represents the optimal nonlinear tax rate formulas as elasticity and
the form of the income distribution. Then, the numerical applications of these
formulas are obtained.
The second group is concentrated on skill distribution. One of the study is
belonging to this group is Hamilton and Pestieau (2005). This study analyzes
the e¤ects of changing fractions of types to the individual utilities by using
maxmax and maxmin forms of welfare functions. The other member of this
group is the Brett and Weymark (2008) who analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent skill
levels on the social welfare.
In addition, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) and Kocherlakota (2005) are the
pioneers of the third group that deals with dynamic models. In Kocherlakota
(2005), a dynamic economy is considered. Agentsskill levels are private in-
formation and change stochastically over time without any restriction. With
these assumptions, tax systems that carry out a symmetric constrained Pareto
optimal allocation are introduced. As a result, he obtain that wealth taxes in
a period depend on the individuals labor income in that period and the for-
mer ones. Nevertheless, in any period, there is an expectation that an agents
wealth tax rate in the next period is zero. Besides that, government does
not accumulate any net revenue from wealth taxes. In Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2006), they introduce a new way of designing a disability insurance system
optimally. Their main assumptions are imperfectly observable disability and
a dynamic environment. What they do is characterize the social optimum
numerically and theoretically. They introduce a tax system that achieves an
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optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium. As a result, they suggest that
their optimal disability system yields signicantly more welfare compared to
the existing system.
The nal group can be categorized as the relevant to optimal education
policies and taxation. In this eld De Fraja (2002) has a signicant contribu-
tion. In his paper, optimal education policy is studied. In the model there
are some assumptions such as utilitarian government, di¤erent income level of
households and di¤erent ability level of their children. It is also accepted that
private education can be used by households without borrowing to nance
it and income taxes can be used by government as a funding of education.
In the education policy that they introduced, as a result of this study, the
spread among the educational success of the bright and the less bright ones
are increased as compared with private provision. In addition, the education
obtained by less bright children increases as their parentsincome increases.
Finally, in their model households with lower income and less bright children
contributes more to the education cost fees compared with the ones with more
income and brighter children. Besides De Fraja (2002), Hare and Ulph (1979),
Bovenberg (2004) and Maldonado (2008) have also contributions in optimal
education policies and taxation.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our
model. In Section 3, we characterize the solutions for the utilitarian problem.
In Section 4, we characterize the solutions for the egalitarian problem. In Sec-
tion 5, we compare the optimal values of the objective social welfare functions
for the three environments discussed in the preceding paragraph and nally
section 6 is the conclusion.
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2 Model
There is a unit measure of agents and they produce output individually ac-
cording to the production function
y = wl
where y denotes output, w denotes skill level, and l denotes labor e¤ort. Each
agents preferences are given by
c  v(l)
where c is consumption and v satisfy v00; v0 > 0.
Following Leung and Yazici (2010) we allow society to choose the distribu-
tion of skill. There are n groups of people and all the agents in one group are
the same type and also have the same skill level. Each group is represented
by index i. For example i = 1 represents the rst group and also type 1. The
measure of type i is pi where pis are exogenous. Since there are n types, there
are n skill levels to be distributed, w1; w2; :::; wn where w1  w2  :::  wn.
There are  total of units of skills to be distributed where  is exogenous.
Therefore society chooses each wi subject toP
i piwi  
and
wi  0 for all i
The rst inequality guarantees that the total amount of skills distributed
cannot be any larger than , and the second inequality states that each skill
level must be nonnegative.
An allocation in this economy is dened as (wi; ci; li) where ci and li repre-
sent consumption and labor allocation of each type i = 1; 2; :::; n respectively.
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An allocation is said to be socially feasible if
P
i pici 
P
i piwili (1)
P
i piwi   (2)
wi; li; ci  0 for all i (3)
The rst inequality says that the total amount of consumption cannot
exceed the total amount of production. The second inequality says that the
total amount of skills distributed cannot be greater than the total available
skill level, . The third inequality says that an allocation must be nonnegative
for each i.
The timing of the events is the same as Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) and as
follows. First, the society chooses the skill distribution. This information
is public. Then, each agent privately draws her skill from this distribution.
Finally, society chooses the consumption and labor allocation and agents an-
nounce their types and receive the corresponding allocation. This informa-
tional friction requires the allocation to satisfy the following familiar incentive
compatibility conditions:
ci   v(li)  cj   v(wjlj
wi
) for all i; j. (4)
A social planner chooses the level of consumption, labor and skill distri-
bution to maximize total welfare subject to social feasibility and incentive
compatibility constraints.
An allocation is utilitarian optimal if it solves
max
wi;ci;li
P
i pi(ci   v(li))
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st. (1),(2); (3) and (4).
An allocation is egalitarian optimal if it solves
max
wi;ci;li
P
i c1   v(l1)
st. (1),(2); (3) and (4).
The main issue in this paper is the optimal skill distributions for both
egalitarian and utilitarian objective functions. Therefore, we focus on wi in
both of the problems. To understand the question better, it is helpful to
consider the set of distributions that are available to the society for n = 2. On
the one extreme, we can set w1 = 0 and w2 = =p2 or w1 = a=p1 and w2 = 0.
That is to say, one extreme is the perfectly unequal skill distribution. On the
other extreme, we can set w1 = w2 = . That is to say, the other extreme
is the perfectly equal skill distribution, which makes everyone identical. In
between, there is a whole range of skill distributions in which both w1, w2 > 0
We know that for each i > j it is impossible for type j to "mimic" type i.
One can see the proof in Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010). Therefore we can re-write
the incentive compatibility constraints as
ci   v(li)  cj   v(wjlj
wi
) for all i; j such that i > j.
With the following lemma we can simplify the incentive compatibility con-
straints further.
Lemma 1 Let (wi ; c

i ; l

i ) be an egalitarian optimal allocation. Then with this
allocation for all i = 2; ::; n if wi 6= wi 1, the incentive compatibility constraint
between type i and i 1 binds and the incentive compatibility constraint between
type i and each type 1  j  i  2 do not bind.
Proof. Let i be given and suppose for a contradiction that the incentive
compatibility constraint between type i and i  1 do not bind. Then we have
ci   v(li ) > ci 1   v(
wi 1l

i 1
wi
)
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Let c0i = c

i    and for all 1  j  i   1 let c0j = cj + j for some  > 0
and j > 0 so that the social feasibility constraint and the incentive constraint
between type i and i   1 are still satised. Moreover with c01 egalitarian
objective function improves. That contradicts with c being optimal.
Now we will show that the incentive compatibility constraints between
types i and each type 1  j  i  2 do not bind.
ci   v(li ) = ci 1   v(
wi 1l

i 1
wi
)
> ci 1   v(li 1)
= ci 2   v(
wi 2l

i 2
wi 1
)
Then
ci   v(li ) > ci 2   v(
wi 2l

i 2
wi 1
)
Since the incentive compatibility constraint between type i and i  2 does
not bind, the incentive compatibility constraints between type i and each type
j  i  3 does not bind either.
Due to Lemma 1, we can rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints as
follows:
ci   v(li ) = ci 1   v(
wi 1l

i 1
wi
) for all i = 2; ::; n
Let i =
wi
wi+1
for all i = 1; 2; :::; n   1. Then we can re-write the skill
constraint as
pnwn + pn 1wnn 1 + pn 2wnn 1n 2 + :::::+ p1wnn 1n 2:::1 = 
Then
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wn =

pn + pn 1n 1 + pn 2n 1n 2 + :::::+ p1n 1n 2:::1
wn 1 =
n 1
pn + pn 1n 1 + pn 2n 1n 2 + :::::+ p1n 1n 2:::1
Or more compactly we have;
wi =

Qn 1
i iPn
k=1 pk
Qn 1
j=k j
for all i = 1; 2; :::n
Hence the skill constraint becomes,
P
i pi

Qn 1
i iPn
k=1 pk
Qn 1
j=k j
= 
Note that at one extreme, as i tends to 1, we have wi =  for all types
i = 1; 2; :::n. That is, we are at perfectly equal skill distribution. At the other
extreme, as i tends to 0 we have wi = 0 for all types i = 1; 2; :::n   1 and
wn =

pn
. That is to say, we have all the available skill level  given to one
type.
Using the notation of i we can re-write the utilitarian social planners
problem as
max
i;ci;li
P
i pi(ci   v(li))
st.
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P
i pici 
P
i pi

Qn 1
i iPn
k=1 pk
Qn 1
j=k j
li
ci   v(li)  cj   v(jlj) for all i; j such that i > j
i 2 [0; 1] for all i = 1; 2; ::::n  1
ci; li  0 for all i = 1; 2; :::::::n
Similarly we can re-write the egalitarian social planners problem as,
max
i;ci;li
c1   v(l1)
st.P
i pici 
P
i pi

Qn 1
i iPn
k=1 pk
Qn 1
j=k j
li
ci   v(li)  ci 1   v(i 1li 1) for all i such that i = 2; 3; ::n
i 2 [0; 1] for all i = 1; 2; ::::n  1
ci; li  0 for all i = 1; 2; :::::::n
3 Utilitarian Optimal Allocation
In this section we analyze the utilitarian optimal skill distributions. For n = 2,
in both full information and private information cases we provide an analytical
results. For n  3, we assume specic forms of utility and disutility functions
and provide numerical analysis with both.
3.1 Analytical result for n = 2
In this section we analyze the utilitarian optimal allocations for n = 2. We rst
characterize the optimal allocations for the case of full information. That is, we
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nd the allocations that maximize utilitarian welfare objective function subject
to social feasibility and non-negativity constraints. Secondly, we characterize
the private information utilitarian optimal allocations. The only di¤erence
in the private information utilitarian social planners problem is the incentive
compatibility constraint between type 2 and type 1. For both in the full and
private information utilitarian optimal skill distribution cases we nd that
i = 0, which is the same result as that of Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010).
3.1.1 Full Information Problem
Following Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) we can re-write the feasibility constraint as
p2c2 + p1c1  al2 + 1p1(l1   l2)
p2 + p11
Then, we can re-write the utilitarian social planners problem as
max
c2;c1;l2;l1;1
p2 [c2   v(l2)] + p1 [c1   v(l1)]
s.t.
p2c2 + p1c1  al2 + 1p1(l1   l2)
p2 + p11
1 2 [0; 1]
c2; c1; l2; l1  0
Proposition 1 In the full information utilitarian optimum 1 = 0.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 is the same as the proof of Theorem 1 in
Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010). Note that even if Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) have the
concavity of utility assumption, there is no use of this assumption in the proof.
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The reason behind this result is the lack of the incentive compatibility
constraint. Without the incentive compatibility constraint, the social planner
does not care about egalitarian distribution so that she considers only the
productive e¢ ciency.
3.1.2 Private information problem
Now, we analyze the private information utilitarian optimal allocation. Then,
the utilitarian social planners problem is
max
c2;c1;l2;l1;1
p2 [c2   v(l2)] + p1 [c1   v(l1)]
st.
p2c2 + p1c1  al2 + 1p1(l1   l2)
p2 + p11
c2   v(l2)  c1   v(1l1)
1 2 [0; 1]
c2; c1; l2; l1  0
Theorem 1 In the private information utilitarian optimum 1 = 0.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 is the same as the proof of Theorem 2 in
Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010). Note that even if, Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) have the
concavity of utility assumption, there is no use of this assumption in the proof.
Theorem 1 states that even in the case of private information, with the
utilitarian social planners problem, it is optimal to distribute all the skill to
type 2.
The following is the intuition behind Theorem 1. Since the utility of each
type is assumed to be linear, a number of combination of feasible consumption
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allocations, (c1; c2) are admissible for the social planner. Therefore, it becomes
easy to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.
By Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 we show that the results of Leung and
Yaz¬c¬(2010) for full information and private information optimum allocations
hold with linear utility as well.
3.2 Analysis for n  3
Since we have not derived analytical results for n  3, we provide a numerical
analysis. In this numerical analysis we assume v(l) = l for some  > 1. With
these functions we have the utilitarian social planners problem as
max
i;ci;li
P
i pi(ci   li )
st.
P
i pici 
P
i pi

Qn 1
i iPn
k=1 pk
Qn 1
j=k j
li
ci   li  ci 1   i 1li 1 for all i = 2; ::; n
i 2 [0; 1] for all i = 1; 2; ::::n  1
ci; li  0 for all i = 1; 2; :::::::n
Lemma 2 Let u(c) = c and v(l) = l. Let R be an associated Lagrange
multiplier of the resource constraint and let i be the associated Lagrange mul-
tiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint between type i and i  1 for all
i = 2; 3; :::; n. Then i = 0 for all i = 2; 3; :::; n.
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Proof. The Lagrangian of the problem reads
L = Pi pi(ci   li ) R(Pi pi(ci   Qn 1i iPn
k=1 pk
Qn 1
j=k j
li))
 n(cn   ln   cn 1 + n 1ln 1)  n 1(cn 1   ln 1   cn 2 + n 2ln 2)
:::  2(c2   l2   c1 + 1 l1)
Then we have the rst order optimality conditions for consumption as
c1 : p1  Rp1 + 2 = 0
ci : pi  Rpi + i+1   i = 0 for all i = 2; 3; :::n  1
cn : pn  Rpn   n = 0
Combining these rst order conditions we get
P
i pi  
P
iRpi = 0, which
implies R = 1. Then plugging R into the rst order conditions of each ci we
see that i = 0 for all i = 2; 3; :::n.
By Lemma 2, in our numerical analysis we can ignore the incentive com-
patibility constraints. Our numerical analysis results show that with n  3;
we have all i = 0. That is to say, all of the skills go to only one type. (i.e.
wn =

pn
and wi = 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n  1).
4 Egalitarian Optimal Allocation
In Section 3, we analyzed the optimal skill distribution when the objective
welfare function is utilitarian with linear utility and strictly convex disutility
functions. In the utilitarian optimal allocation we always have all the skills
allocated to the highest skilled type, regardless of the number of the types in
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the society. Therefore, we ask "what if the available skill level in the society is
distributed in a more egalitarian manner?" That is, "what if the net utility of
the lowest skilled type, type 1, is maximized subject to the incentive compat-
ibility constraints of the other types?" Formally, the social planners problem
with egalitarian objective welfare function is
max
i;ci;li
c1   v(l1)
s.t.P
i pici 
P
i piwiliP
i piwi  
ci   v(li)  ci 1   v(i 1li 1) for all i = 2; ::; n
li; ci  0 for all i
i 2 [0; 1]
Since we cannot derive analytical results for egalitarian optimal allocations,
we provide numerical analysis with u(c) = c and v(l) = l for some  > 1.
The striking result is that in egalitarian optimal allocation, type n has all the
skills. Plugging u and v into the egalitarian social planners problem we can
re-write it as
max
i;ci;li
c1   l1
st.
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P
i pici 
P
i pi

Qn 1
i iPn
k=1 pk
Qn 1
j=k j
li
ci   li  ci 1   (i 1li 1) for all i = 2; ::; n
li; ci  0 for all i = 1; 2; :::n
i 2 [0; 1] for all i = 1; 2; ::; n
Since the incentive compatibility constraints bind at the optimum we have
ci = l

i + ci 1   (i 1li 1) for all i = 2; 3; :::; n
cn = l

n + cn 1   (n 1ln 1)
cn 1 = l

n 1 + cn 2   (n 2ln 2)
:
:
:
c2 = l

2 + c1   (1 l1)
Since the resource constraint binds at the optimum as well, we have,
P
i pici = c1 +
Pn
i=2 pi:
Pi
j=2[l

i   j 1lj 1] =
P
i piwili
Hence,
c1   l1 =
P
i piwili  
Pn
i=2 pi:
Pi
j=2[l

i   j 1lj 1]  l1
Therefore, we can re-write the egalitarian social planners problem as
max
i2[0;1]
P
i piwili  
Pn
i=2 pi:
Pi
j=2[l

i   j 1lj 1]  l1
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where
wi =

Qn 1
j=i jP
i pi
Qn 1
j=i j
Having this functional form which depends only on  = (1; ::::; n 1), we
conduct a numerical analysis.
5 Comparisons
In this section we compare overall utilities obtained in a laissez-faire market
structure, Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution and Mirrleesian taxa-
tion with skill distribution via numerical analysis for utilitarian and egalitarian
social welfare functions. We assume v(l) = l for our numerical analysis and
calculate the social welfare functions in all cases for various fractions pi, skill
level  and .
5.1 Laissez Faire Market
In a laissez faire market, each type of agents solves their own problem. That
is, each type of agents maximizes her net utility subject to what she produces.
Formally each type of agents solves the following problem.
max ci   li
s:t:
ci = wili for all i f1; 2; :::; ng
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From the rst order optimality conditions we have
li = (
wi

)
1
 1
ci = wi(
wi

)
1
 1
Hence, we have the utilitarian optimal welfare function as
P
i pi(wi(
wi

)
1
 1   (wi

)

 1 )
and the egalitarian optimal social welfare function reads
w1(
w1

)
1
 1   (w1

)

 1
5.2 Mirrleesian Taxation without Skill Distribution
We analyze both utilitarian optimal and egalitarian optimal allocations for
Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution. That is, we take each types
skill level as given.
We can write the utilitarian social welfare function as
max
ci;li
P
i pi(ci   li )
s:t
P
i pici 
P
i piwili
ci   li  ci 1   i 1li 1 for all i such that i = 2; 3; ::n  1
ci; li  0 for all i = 1; 2; :::::::n
28
From the rst order optimality conditions we have
li = (
wi

)
1
 1 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n.
Hence, the optimal production becomes
y =
P
i pi(
wi

)
1
 1wi =
P
i pici
Then the utilitarian social welfare function reads at the optimum
P
i pici  
P
i pi(l

i )
 =
P
i pi(
wi

)
1
 1wi  
P
i pi

(
wi

)
1
 1

Note that the objective functions of utilitarian optimal Mirrleesian taxation
without skill distribution and the utilitarian laissez-faire market is the same.
The egalitarian social planners problem for Mirrleesian taxation without
skill distribution is written as
max
ci;li
c1   l1
st.P
i pici 
P
i piwili
ci   li  ci 1   i 1li 1 for all i such that i = 2; 3; ::n  1
ci; li  0 for all i = 1; 2; :::::::n
We note that the resource constraint binds. Moreover, the incentive com-
patibility constraints bind as well. Hence, combining the objective function
and these constraints, the egalitarian social planners becomes
max
li
Pn
i=1 piwili  
Pn
i=2 pi:
Pi
j=2[l

i   j 1lj 1]  l1
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s:t
li  0 for all i = 1; 2; :::::::n
The rst order conditions yield
l1 = (
p1w1
(1  (1  p1)1)
)
1
   1
li = (
piwi
(
Pn
k=i pk   i
Pn
k=i+1 pk)
)
1
   1 for all i = 2; :::n
Hence the maximized social welfare function reads
c1   l1 =
Pn
i=1 piwil

i  
Pn
i=2 pi:
Pi
j=2[(l

i )
   j 1(lj 1)]  (l1)
5.3 Comparisons with Utilitarian and Egalitarian Social
Planners Problem
In this section, we compare the results of the numerical analysis we obtained for
three di¤erent environments, laissez-faire market, Mirrleesian taxation without
skill distribution and Mirrleesian taxation with skill distribution. We compare
the results for n = 2 and n = 3.
Results for n=2 In this part, we compare the values of both utilitarian
and egalitarian social welfare functions that are obtained in di¤erent envi-
ronments for n = 2. We assume p1 = 0:5, p2 = 0:5 and  = 1. With
these values, we conduct our analysis for ve di¤erent values of . That is,
 2 f1:1; 1:5; 2:0; 2:7; 4:0g. Given ; p1; p2 and , we compare the values of the
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optimal social welfare functions in these three environment for three di¤erent
values of w1. That is w1 2 f0; 0:5; 1g.
Figure 1 and Figure 3 summarize our results for the utilitarian and egali-
tarian social planners problem respectively for n = 2.
Our rst result is, it is always optimal to distribute all of the skills to one
type in a society, the type with highest skill, regardless of whether egalitarian
or utilitarian social welfare functions are used. This result shows that the
results of Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) hold with di¤erent assumptions and with
di¤erent social welfare functions.
Secondly, as expected, the value of the utilitarian and egalitarian social
welfare functions in the Mirrleesian taxation with skill distribution environ-
ment always yields a better result than its value in the other two environments.
This nding is because, while we allow skill distribution, we are treating one
of the parameter as a variable and choosing the value of that variable which
maximizes our objective function. In the other environments we take this
parameter as a given. An increase in welfare from Mirrleesian taxation with-
out skill distribution to Mirrleesian taxation with skill distribution is always
more than an increase from a laissez faire market to Mirrleesian taxation with-
out skill distribution in both utilitarian and egalitarian problems. The result
shows, the importance of skill distribution numerically.
Our nal result is that an economy with perfectly unequal skill distribution
provides a more egalitarian society in terms of how utilities are distributed
across agents, in both utilitarian and egalitarian problems. This result shows
that more equal distribution can be obtained by distributing skills.
Another observation is about the value of . As seen in the gure 1,
as the value of  increases, that is as the value of disutility increases, the
di¤erence among the values of the welfare function in these three environments
get smaller. For instance, when  = 1:1 and w1 = 0:5; the value of the welfare
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function in the Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution environment is
1:516; whereas the value of the welfare function is 35:891 when skill distribution
is allowed. However, when  = 4:0 and w1 = 0:5; the values becomes 0:499
and 0:595 respectively. This observation demonstrates that as the cost of labor
e¤ort in terms of disutility increases, the incentive for the social planner to
implement skill redistribution decreases.
Results for n = 3 Numerical analysis for n = 3 similar to the one we made
for n = 2 are done. Figure 2 and 4 summarize our results. As opposed to
Figures 1 and 3, in Figures 2 and 4, we did not calculate the net utilities of
the types 1; 2 and 3. We only calculated the overall objective welfare.1 All of
arguments we made for n = 2 apply to n = 3 as well.
6 Conclusion
The motivation of our study is how to redistribute income earning skills in
a heterogeneous society to reach the social optimum. By social optimum we
mean both equity and e¢ ciency. By equity we mean each type has utility
as close to each other as possible and by e¢ ciency we mean producing more
with the same level of labor e¤ort. To nd a solution to this question we
analyzed the optimal skill distribution with utilitarian and egalitarian social
welfare functions.
Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) is the rst to study this question in the Mirrleesian
environment. In their paper they introduce a new channel of redistribution
1We generalize this procedure for arbitrary n . Due to the memory constraints of Matlab,
we made the numerical analysis up to n = 10. In all cases, we see that the objective welfare
function is maximized when all i = 0. All the comments in the Results sections are valid
for arbitrary n as well.
32
in a static Mirrleesian economy, which is to let the planner choose an ex-ante
distribution of skills. Given a constant level of total skill between two types
of agents, they show that the planner always nds it optimal to choose the
perfectly unequal skill distribution. As opposed to Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010),
our contribution to the literature is providing numerical simulations to measure
the welfare e¤ects of skill distribution choice under di¤erent social welfare
functions and the characterization of optimal skill distributions for di¤erent
objective welfare functions with di¤erent assumptions.
Our rst result showed that, it is always optimal to distribute all of the
skills to one type in a society (the type with highest skill) regardless of whether
we used egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare functions. By this, we show
that the results of Leung and Yaz¬c¬(2010) hold with di¤erent assumptions
and with di¤erent welfare functions. Secondly, the increase in welfare from
Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution to Mirrleesian taxation with
skill distribution is always much more than the increase from laissez faire
market to Mirrleesian taxation without skill distribution in both utilitarian
and egalitarian problems. With this result, we show the importance of the
skill distribution numerically. Since in our numerical analysis the increase
with the skill distribution is signicant, it is a good sign for policy makers
to consider this seriously. Our nal result is that an economy with perfectly
unequal skill distribution provides a more egalitarian society in terms of how
utilities are distributed across agents, again in both utilitarian and egalitarian
problems. This result shows that with skill distribution not only we increase
total welfare but also make a more equal distribution.
We present three possible extensions for our study. The rst possible ex-
tension is analyzing the optimum skill distribution for other social welfare
functions. Secondly, for the egalitarian problem we did not present an analyt-
ical solution, which can be investigated. Finally, a more extensive numerical
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analysis with real data where parameters are estimated can be performed.
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8 Appendices
8.1 A.1 Numerical Analysis
Since the numerical analysis for n = 2 and n = 3 depends only on 1 =
w1
w2
,
2 =
w2
w3
respectively it is easy to perform a numerical analysis for these cases.
However for n > 3, the analysis becomes more complex. For instance, when
n = 4, the objective function becomes a function of 1 =
w1
w2
, 2 =
w2
w3
and
3 =
w3
w4
. In this case, we need a four dimensional space to visualize the
values of the objective function. To simplify our analysis we represent this
four dimensional space by a two dimensional matrix. The main tool we use is
the Kronecker product of two vectors. Let kron(A;B) denote the Kronecker
product of matrices A and B.
Let n = 4 and let i = [0 1=m 2=m :::1]1(m+1) be a m + 1 dimensional
vector for i = 1; ::; 3. Then we can generate all possible combinations of 1,2
and 3 with the following procedure.
First calculate the Kronecker product 1 and the transpose of 2, 
0
2. Then
calculate the Kronecker product of 3 and this resulting Kronecker product.
That is,
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kron(1; 
0
2) =
26666666666664
2
0 1=m : : 1
0 0 0 : : 0
1 1=m 0 1=m
2 1=m
: : :
: : :
1 0 1=m 1
37777777777775
kron(3; kron(1; 
0
2)) = [0kron(1; 02) j 1=mkron(1; 02)::: j1 kron(1; 02)]
which is an mm2 dimensional matrix.
Then we generalize this procedure for arbitrary n and perform our numeri-
cal analysis. Due to the memory constraints of Matlab, we made the numerical
analysis up to n = 10. In all cases, we see that the objective welfare function
is maximized when all i = 0.
8.2 A.2 Tables
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Figure 1: Utilitarian Social Planners Problem for n = 2:
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Figure 2: Utilitarian Social Planners Problem for n = 3.
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Figure 3: Egalitarian Social Planners Problem for n = 2:
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Figure 4: Egalitarian Social Planners Problem for n = 3:
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